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Abstract 
The concept of security incorporates within its meaning, at the same time, political, 
social and cultural connotations, and essentially entails a certain malleability that may, 
at times, escape any aim for legal structure. Without a doubt, no contemporary theory of 
international law, no international relations approach, and no political or humanistic discourse 
can currently avoid it, regardless of the angle according to which it is dealt with. As to the 
notion of governance, it has been described as the sum of the many ways individuals and 
institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs through a dynamic and complex 
process of interactive decision-making. When attempting to encompass both ideas, that is, 
if the question about governance (on a global scale) is indeed pertinent or even possible 
security wise, the fact is that working with probabilities –as security requires it-, and trying 
to organize them and build them into a plan, certainly makes mandatory to question if that 
response to different sets of circumstances is structured according to a process of interactive 
decision-making –as mentioned before-, in the search for the encompassment of the majority 
of subjects of international law is merely logical, which is the aim of this paper. 
The Concept of security
and the Viability of Global Governance
By: Carolina Aguirre Echeverri
1. The notion of security 
“Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law 
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time”1. Well, such 
a statement can certainly be considered anything but peaceful. M. 
Koskenniemi, for example, would suggest that “our inherited idea of a 
World Order based on the Rule of Law thinly hides from sight the fact 
that social conflict must still be solved by political means”2. Indeed, 
the words above apply in a certainly accurate manner to the concept 
of security, which incorporates within its meaning, at the same time, 
political, social and cultural connotations, and essentially entails a 
certain malleability that may, at times, escape any aim for legal struc-
ture or infallible coherence. One can even state that due to said mal-
1. Louis Henkin, In Nathan A. Canestaro, “Real-
ism and transnationalism: competing visions for 
international security” Boston University Interna-
tional Law Journal, vol 25, p.113. 
 2. Martti Koskenniemi, “The Politics of Interna-
tional Law” European Journal of International 
Law. vol.1, 1990, p. 1.
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leability and lack of precise definition, security has become a plastic 
word.3 It has certainly developed into a positively interesting word; 
problematic for some, considerably handy for others, and consistently 
invoked within the international system by its multiple agents. Without 
a doubt, no contemporary theory of international law, no international 
relations approach, and certainly no political or humanistic discourse 
can currently avoid it, regardless of the angle or perspective accord-
ing to which it is dealt with. 
From partial visions of the globalization phenomenon such as hy-
perglobalism or transformationalist thesis; from international legal 
theories that oppose each other such as realism or transnationalism; 
or doctrines regarding the use of force and intervention in another 
State’s territory like humanitarian intervention -and more recently, 
responsibility to protect-; to opinions about United States and its 
”presence”, ”invasion” or “intervention” in Iraq, the issue of security 
constitutes common ground and shared foundation for each of the 
above, and to address such a subject is certainly appealing for some, 
compelling for others. The issue that this paper seeks to address, 
since it apparently causes a certain level of perplexity, is whether 
political interaction and co-operative actions between international 
agents have developed enough for it to be possible to state that there 
is a certain level of compliance with international law –considering 
that it is a normative system-, and if rules regarding security matters 
are perceived as binding by the subjects of international law –there-
fore satisfactorily accommodating diverging and conflicting interests-, 
that is, if there is on some degree global governance with regard to 
the element of security. Why? Foucault’s definition of security is most 
enlightening. According to the scholar, 
“Sovereignty capitalizes a territory, raising the major problem of 
the seat of government, whereas discipline structures a space 
and addresses the essential problem of a hierarchical and 
functional distribution of elements, and security will try to plant 
a milieu in terms of events or possible elements, of series that 
will have to be regulated by a multivalent and transformable 
framework”.4
Since governance has been described as the sum of the many ways 
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their com-
mon affairs; and the scope of security would particularly require to 
encompass powerful actors into a dynamic and complex process of 
interactive decision-making, Foucault’s explanation clarifies the fact 
that security does not seek to arrive at a point of perfection, and it is 
3. Josefina Echavarría Álvarez, “La promesa de 
(in)seguridad; algunas reflexiones críticas” Re-
vista Estudios Políticos, num. 28, 2006, p. 102.
4. Michel Foucault, 1977, Security, territory, 
population; Lectures at The College de France 
1977-1978, Picador, 2009, p. 35
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more a matter of maximizing the positive elements and minimizing 
what is risky and inconvenient –that is, the treatment of the uncer-
tain, of the aleatory-  like theft or disease, while knowing that they will 
never be completely suppressed.5 All of the above said, the question 
about governance (on a global scale) is indeed pertinent, mostly be-
cause security means working with probabilities, and trying to orga-
nize and build into a plan different elements and functions, positive 
or negative.6 Security works on the future, not planning according to a 
static perception, but open to a future that is not exactly controllable, 
not precisely measurable7; therefore to question if that response to 
different sets of circumstances is structured according to a process 
of interactive decision-making –as mentioned before-, in the search 
for the encompassment of the majority of subjects of international 
law is merely logical. 
According to a classical approach, security has traditionally been 
considered a matter of state –domestic insecurity may or may not 
dominate the national agenda, but external threats almost surely 
will constitute a crucial issue of national security8-, and as such it 
has been studied, analyzed and criticized from an important num-
ber of perspectives and angles, and it appears to be a number of 
issues concerning the concept, starting with its definition. Conven-
tional approaches seeking for a definition have been developed by 
scholars like Buzan, who defined security as “the aim of being free of 
menace”9 In this regard; a traditional approach is most likely to equal 
security with National Security, that is, the integrity of the national ter-
ritory and its institutions, as well as the state’s ability to defend itself 
against external treats. It is indeed a Hobessian conception of the 
world order as a state of nature, on which states constitute a superior 
order that provides security inside its territory, and shields individu-
als in order to protect them from external terror. The fundaments of 
a classical definition of security can be traced back to the Peace of 
Westfalia, considered by some scholars as the act that founded and 
structured the conditions based upon which states would coexist, 
hence, as quintessential for the international system. In fact, the ele-
ment of sovereignty, which is inherent to the concept of state itself, 
was a deciding factor in the consolidation of the international system. 
Accordingly, states do consider it to be their right to exercise author-
ity by coercive means, and their prerogative to defend their territory 
autonomously, which has been made clear enough in the United Na-
tions Charter, which includes security as one of its purposes, as the 
Organ in charge of it within the international sphere.10 In any case, the 
Peace of Westfalia is by definition opposite to the concept of global 
government (if the latter were to be understood as the existence of 
5. Ibid., p. 34 
  6. Ibid.
  7. Ibid., p. 35
  8. Ibid., p. 103 
 9. Ibid.
  10. United Nations Charter. Article 2,
55
Journal of International Law
The concept of security and the viability of global governance
January - June 2010 Colombia | Vol.1, 01. 
an entity that beholds power and control over states), due to the fact 
that the possibility of the existence of an authority greater than states 
was immediately rules out, since the main characteristic of all states 
signing the Peace was that they were all equals. Indeed, state’s au-
tonomy and authority, according to the classical formula of external 
sovereignty, recognizes no superior power. 
Now, by virtue of the Treaties of Westfalia, the rights of autonomy 
and sovereignty that states were entitled to due to the fact of be-
ing recognized as such, entails for that state the possibility of self 
determination, and by extension, the right to go to war (ius ad bel-
lum). However, after World War II, a tendency regarding the search 
for community integration developed, and the creation of United Na-
tions Charter constituted an attempt towards the constitutionaliza-
tion of the international system. As a consequence, an incipient step 
towards global governance was made, given that states intended to 
find the means for conflict resolution on a scope of no enforcement 
compliance. Indeed, interdependency between states did grow after 
the Second World War, and as a result, so did the level of intromission 
in other states’ domestic affairs.  
2. Reevaluation of the classical notion 
of security 
2.1. International relations theories 
Criticism to the traditional conception has aroused from different 
sides. Globalization theories; legal and philosophical theories or pos-
tures regarding international relations; and further developments of 
the prohibition of the use of force, among others, have challenged, 
complemented or reformulated the notion of security in different ways. 
For example, realism as a theory of states’ motives has embraced the 
idea that without menace there is no security, and that insecurity is 
the crucial element for the existence of states -hence security must 
remain as a promise11-. Canestaro’s explains that realism suggests 
that states are constantly competing for security and power within an 
anarchical international system incapable of preventing aggression 
or conflict, and that “because every state maintains an offensive ca-
pacity to harm others, each must gain and retain power at any cost or 
risk predation by aggressors”12. As a result, in the absence of central-
ized enforcement or adjudication of international law, realists argue 
that the international system remains anarchical, with law reduced 
to empty legalisms used to justify the pursuit of national ends, and 
11. Josefina Echavarría Álvarez. Op. cit., p.106 
12. Louis Henkin, Op. cit., p. 2.
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global governance as an utopian desire, due to states’ selfish inter-
ests and unwillingness regarding political cooperation. In direct oppo-
sition to this thesis, transnationalism explains that cooperation, not 
competition, is the defining characteristic of international relations, 
and that democratization and global economic interdependence re-
duce the benefits of interstate conflicts and encourage long term co-
operation. Global governance would be a real possibility under this 
perspective, since states would have binding legal obligations under 
international law, and those rules would gradually develop into a rule-
based community capable of regulating the behavior of states, since 
trough a framework of international law, norms and regimes, states’ 
sovereignty would slowly yield to international legal norms that lessen 
the likelihood of conflict.13 
The problem with Canestaro exposé is that the author claims that the 
purpose of his work is to determine if the latter philosophies can be 
reconciled, therefore allowing us to determine if there is a possibility 
for the existence of global governance under the scope of legal theo-
ries, but he fails to sound convincing on how the reconciliation actu-
ally works. He first states they have little in common, but concludes 
that there is room for both transnationalism and realism in the scope 
of international law.14  Such a conclusion shows that evidently a politi-
cally correct path was chosen: 
“The next few years may be determinative of the role of interna-
tional law in security-military issues for decades to come - the 
continuance of the “war on terror,” a potential nuclear show-
down with Iran or North Korea - all hold historic opportunities 
to either reinforce or repudiate international norms and institu-
tions. In the meantime, it seems prudent to suggest that we can 
neither completely adopt nor dismiss transnationalism or real-
ism as explanative doctrines in international relations. These 
two doctrines can be reconciled not because their tenets are 
complementary - but instead because their two worlds seem to 
co-exist in the course of daily affairs.”15
Well, to state that a hybrid international system allows scholars and 
policymakers to interpret sates’ actions in accordance to their own 
theoretical paradigm does not seem to bring much help to the dis-
cussion; however, such conclusions are not scarce, because finding 
a middle ground seems, most of the time, a perfectly happy ending. 
Likewise, dissertations about the relationship between international 
law and international relations and their focus on the laws of state 
behavior often reach conclusions like this: “the prospects for genuine 
13. Ibíd. 
 14. Ibid. 
 15. Ibíd. 
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interdisciplinary collaboration, to the benefit of both disciplines, have 
never been better”16.  It would appear that authors that choose this 
kind of path afford no clarity as to whether there is or there is not 
global governance –or at least some incipient ground for it-, and Cane-
staro’s arguments seem to resemble at some point the Habermas – 
Foucault tension, whose perspectives reveal acute tension between 
power and law, just like realism and transnationalism. Regarding the 
relationship between law and power, Habermas states “that authori-
zation of power by law and the sanctioning of law by power must both 
occur uno acto”17. Foucault, on the other hand, aims for an analysis 
that frees itself from a representation such as power-sovereignty, or 
power-law. In words of Flyberg: 
 “It is in this connection that Foucault made his famous argu-
ment to cut off the head of the king, in political analysis and re-
place it by a decentred understanding of power. For Habermas, 
the head of the King is still very much on, in the sense that sov-
ereignty is a prerequisite for the regulation of power by law”18. 
Indeed, a paraphrase of the Habermas – Foucault debate surely does 
not constitute a consistent analysis and a new approach on the mat-
ter, and quite frankly, the exposition falls into what Foucault denomi-
nates an imperative discourse, that in theoretical domain consist in 
saying “love this, hate that, this is good, that is bad”19, or according 
to a very safe in-between perspective, “reconcile this with that, this 
is useful, discard that, there is room for all positions”. The problem 
with imperative discourses is that they belong more to an aesthetic 
dimension, and therefore can only be based on choices of an aes-
thetic order.20 That very comfortable middle ground seems like the 
politically correct option, which safely allows agreeing with everyone, 
and conveniently taking the best of each world in order to create a 
mixture of ideas, all aesthetically put together and coexisting without 
overturning each other. Although it may seem handy, it is certainly not 
very objective, and consequently, not particularly helpful. 
2.2. Human Security – the changing content 
of the prohibition of the Use of Force and the 
consequences it entails for the notion of security
There is a relatively recent and increasingly embraced perspective that 
understands security as human security, meaning that the traditional 
approach should be challenged by arguing that a proper referent for 
security should be the individual rather than the state. According to 
16. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law 
and International Relations theory: a dual 
agenda” American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 87, num. 2, p. 238.
17. Bent Flyberg, “Habermas and Foucault: think-
ers for civil society?” British Jounal of of Sociol-
ogy, vol. 49 num. 2., june 1998, p. 214.
18. Ibíd.
19. Michel Foucault Op. cit., p. 17.
20. Ibíd. 
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the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
four more radical challenges to the notion of state sovereignty have 
emerged: continuing demands for self-determination, a broadened 
conception of international peace and security, the collapse of state 
authority and the increasing importance of popular sovereignty.21  In 
this regard, the Report of the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty suggests that the most marked security 
phenomenon since the end of the Cold War has been the proliferation 
of armed conflict within states, and that such disputes have aroused 
due to demands for greater political rights and other political objec-
tives. The Report also explains that an unhappy trend of contempo-
rary conflict has been the increased vulnerability of civilians, and that 
efforts to suppress armed (or unarmed) dissent have in too many 
cases led to excessive and disproportionate actions by governments, 
harming civilian population. 
A very common opinion shared by Human Security supporters 
establishes that
 
“The concept of security has far too long been interpreted nar-
rowly; as security of territory from external aggression, or as 
protection of national interests in foreign policy… It has been 
related more to nation-states than to people… Nations have for-
gotten the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought 
security in their daily lives”.22
However, apparently there is no reason to worry, because the inter-
national community is widely resorting to human security as the idea 
that resolves what has been referred to as the existing dilemma of 
becoming a “complicit bystander in massacres, ethnic cleansing and 
even genocide”23, and intervening even with the risk of not being able 
to “mitigate such abuses”24, and even taking sides in intra-state con-
flicts.  The common element that links every single international agent, 
individual, organism, entity, etc. that addresses or chooses to rely on 
human security is the fact that all of them resort to moral arguments 
or to some sort of propagandistic or even sentimental language to 
base upon them their opinions or to strengthen them. From scholars 
stating that “the analysis of recent conflicts entails not only identify-
ing who is the decision maker regarding the dispute, or the reasons 
that led to it, but also, and even more important, to understand the 
misery arousing due to the conflict”25; from authors assuring that “re-
sponsibility to protect can successfully bypass a deadlocked Security 
Council to finally liberate mankind from the odious scourge of the 
atrocity crimes”26; and reports asserting that “... [It is the] Commis-
 21. Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, Inter-
national Commission on Intervention and State 
22. Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect” 
available at: www. Iciss.gc.ca,
 United Nations Development Programme, “New 
Dimensions on Human Security”, Web site Hu-
man Development Reports, [on line] available 
in:  http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_
en_chap2.pdf.,  access: july 9, 2009. 
  23. Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, Op. cit., p. 5
  24. Ibíd.
 25.  Maria Teresa Aya Smitmans, “Seguridad 
Humana en Colombia: Donde no hay bienestar 
no puede haber paz” Revista Opera, Universidad 
Externado de Colombia, num. 6, 2006, p 257. 
26.  J. Brown, “The Question of right authority: 
Moving the Responsibility to Protect from soft 
to hard law”. ILSA Quarterly,  vol. 17, num. 2, 
December 2008, p. 17.
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sion’s view that human security is indeed indivisible. There is no lon-
ger such a thing as humanitarian catastrophe occurring in a faraway 
country of which we know little”27; to almost every single academic or 
author quoting Kofi Annan’s famous28 “If humanitarian intervention 
is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica –to gross and systematic viola-
tions of human rights that offend every precept of our humanity?”29, 
the search for legitimacy is, without a doubt, the key to all matters cur-
rently regarding what has been identified as the opposition between 
security and human rights30. Indeed, as Christine Gray explains, “The 
operation against Iraq has also had a precedential impact in that it 
made clear the advantages of the legitimacy which only the Security 
Council could confer… States preferred to exploit the notion of au-
thorization rather than to rely exclusively on any unilateral right to 
use force”.31 However, there are opinions that tend to believe that a 
search sometimes so fiercely conducted in order to achieve legitima-
cy through political proselytism and the encouragement of doctrines 
that can later be regarded as opinio juris may sometimes entail the 
distortion of certain legal institutions or previous events: 
 “R2P treats sovereignty as more hindrance than protection 
and the UN Charter less as sovereignty’s guarantor than the 
guarantor of the rights of individuals… Instinct should warn 
us there must be something wrong with an idea that can be 
endorsed by such strange bedfellows. There is. R2P has ap-
pealed to so many because it suits too many cross-purposes. 
We should be cautious about turning it from political tool to 
legal principle.”32
Evidently, the actual existence or level of consolidation of global gov-
ernance within the scope of the use of force is a thorny subject. If a 
security crisis were to develop in any given territory, and it was made 
clear that states do have the duties of preventing, reacting and re-
building, the extent up to which the content and implications of those 
duties could be stressed –therefore revealing the degree on which 
global governance is in fact established and how legitimate it is per-
ceived- is nowhere near being unanimous. References to the reformu-
lation –and sometimes death- of sovereignty have poured since past 
years, and the weakening of state power and legitimacy has been 
understood sometimes as a goal for human security and the pallia-
tion of humanitarian crisis, as shown by statements as the following: 
“… Although the key term of the (Security Council) resolution is recom-
mendation, a military intervention with a supra-majority of member 
27. Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, Op. cit., p. 23.
28. Aside from the fact that the opinion of the 
Secretary General, regardless of how coherent 
or sane it may be, is not per se binding to states, 
and putting also aside the fact that apparently 
there is no source of international law upon 
which the opinion of the Secretary General can 
be based upon in order for it to be considered 
as binding, and, consequently, for subjects of 
international law to have the obligation to comply 
with it
29. Kofi Annan, We the people: The role of the 
United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, in 
www.un.org/millenium. Quoted by Canadian-
sponsored International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty and author 
Justin Brown. 
30. Karima Bennoune, “Sovereignty vs. Suffer-
ing? Re-examining sovereignty and human rights 
through the lens of Iraq” European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 13, 2002, p. 2. 
31. Christine Gray, “From unity to polarization: 
International Law and the use of force against 
Iraq”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 
13, num. 1, 2002, p. 8. 
32. Jose Álvarez, “The Schizophrenias of R2P. 
Panel presentation at the 2007 Hague Joint Con-
ference on Contemporary Issues of International 
Law, available inhttp://www.asil.org/pdfs/r2p-
Panel.pdf, accesed: july 9, 2009.
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states has the necessary moral and political clout to be classified as 
legal –even without subsequent Security Council endorsement”.33
As a result, some scholars like Bennoune have pointed out that 
“Increasing use has been made by some international lawyers of a 
simple binary opposition, holding that the preservation of sovereignty 
inherently vitiates concepts of human rights while conversely the ero-
sion of sovereignty is a bell-wether of progress for human rights”.34 
The author also explains that, in her opinion, there seems to have 
been a basic misunderstanding in approaches to sovereignty, since 
it has been overlooked that sovereignty “has become an attribute 
that states are required to exercise in accordance with international 
law”.35 The point is, as she portraits the situation:
 “In human right terms, state has a duality of functions. On the 
one hand, it is a most likely perpetrator of human rights abus-
es. In response, human rights law must limit the role of the 
state, delimit it sovereign powers. On the other hand the state 
is also the agent thought most likely to be able to protect its 
citizens from harms committed by others, whether they be non-
governmental armed groups, private persons, multinationals or 
foreign aggressors. The state is also vital to building the rule of 
law. Hence, a radical ambivalence”.36 
What could be the conclusion then? Well, there are certainly gross 
state violations of human rights in the name of security and the pres-
ervation of state’s sovereignty, as well as the exercise of the right of 
self determination; but it has also been suggested that the move-
ment of power away from the state to uncontrolled entities that have 
barely begun to be subjects of international law –like private prisons, 
corporate security forces and non-state armed groups- can also be 
a frightening spectre in human rights terms.37 Indeed, a radical am-
bivalence, mostly because if both the right of self determination and 
human rights were to be considered peremptory norms, which means 
they cannot be derogated or violated by any subject of international 
law, how is it possible to reconcile both, or to recognize only one of 
them, disregarding the other? 
 33. J. Brown, Op. cit., p. 20
  34. Karima Bennoune, Op. cit., p. 2
  35. Ibíd., p. 3.
36. Ibíd., p.17. 
  37. Ibíd., p.. 18. 
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2.3. Globalization theories – reformulations of the 
role of states and consequently of their role regard-
ing security issues 
The notion of globalization has become the greatest cliché of our time: 
the great idea that covers everything, from financial markets to the In-
ternet, from security to drug dealing. However, clichés sometimes are 
able to capture elements from a certain experience, and globaliza-
tion as a phenomenon reflects a very common perception about the 
world today: that it is being mold into a social space shared by social, 
economical and technological forces, and that events that occur at 
a certain region in the world may entail profound consequences to 
individuals or communities another extreme of the world.38
Indeed, hyperglobalists, skeptics and transformationalists all be-
lieve that globalization is a phenomenon that redefined the previous 
global order –although each one of those theories reaches different 
conclusions-, since it meant that states’ interdependency grew, and 
consequently, that the level of intromission from any given state in 
another state’s business grew as well. According to hyperglobalism, 
for instance, globalization is a phenomenon caused mainly because 
of economic forces like capitalism and technology –which would be-
come the very foundation of the system-, and states are bound to 
disappear, given that they have no longer absolute power or author-
ity within their territory or over matters that used to concern strictly 
them, like agriculture or security, among others. Security would in fact 
be considered one of the main flaws of the previous international or-
der, and it would be no longer deemed a national issue, mainly be-
cause from the hyperglobalists point of view, national boarders and 
the state itself are eroded, which is why their decline would be immi-
nent. Moreover, as a consequence of the economic interdependence, 
war would be a very onerous situation, because the defense of any 
given domestic system would simply be rejected by all the interna-
tional community, in accordance with the new liberal values of the 
new world order. Hyperglobalism would simply be the quintessence of 
global governance, since there would be perfect synchrony of state’s 
interests –mainly because there would be no external menaces, given 
that there would be no “exterior”, and the common ground would be 
a system with no security crisis and no conflicts arousing, considering 
that states would only exist as mere domesticated entities, with no 
national interests to defend. 
Conversely, skeptic scholars believe that nation-states are nothing 
but reinforced and enhanced, therefore globalization as a phenom-
38. David Held et al., Transformaciones globales; 
Política, economía y cultura, Mexico D.F, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. XXIX.
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enon would not entail the uprising of new world order that is not cen-
tered in nation-states.39 On the contrary, from a skeptic point of view, 
Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction would be more valid than ever, 
since such a distinction would be considered as the foundation of 
the basic political formula of nation-states, and in consequence, of 
the international system. The latter is a milieu that entails for states 
the need of relating in a context of force, with consequent increase 
of centralism regarding security decisions and procedures, and gov-
ernments, instead of being regarded as the victims or globalization, 
would be considered its main architect.40 Nevertheless, some skep-
tic theories –like Huntington’s- are not always extreme in every as-
pect, but instead add other considerations to the skeptic perspec-
tive. He does emphasize that “while expectations of a whole united 
world arise at the end of great conflicts, human history has shown 
that individuals have a tendency of dividing the world in two: us and 
them, one’s own group and everybody else, our civilization and those 
barbarians”41; and suggests not only that states are and will continue 
to be the main subjects of the international system –since as such 
entities they train armies, direct diplomatic policies, negotiate trea-
ties, go to war, control international organizations, and influence and 
configure commerce and production42-, but also that governments’ 
priority is national security and external menaces. However, Hunting-
ton also suggests that not all states consider their own interests in 
the same exact way, and that even tough states do define their inter-
ests on the basis of power and security as they main concern, each 
state’s culture, national institutions and own values would influence 
their interests and decisions regarding security affairs, therefore there 
could be varying levels of governance within states that share a cer-
tain kind of values –or in Huntington’s words, that belong to the same 
civilization-, given that they would be able to encompass interests that 
are not conflicting in essence. 
Lastly, transformationalists’ approaches assure that states are not 
disappearing, nor are they being reinforced; on the contrary, they are 
bound to reshape themselves. Consequently, sovereignty is not ques-
tioned nor is it reinforced; it is just bound to be redefined, since it 
is considered to be a necessary element regarding states relation-
ships. Transformationalism also understands that states’ territory is 
not bound to become global and also that it is not being enhanced 
according to regional basis. It is their belief that states’ territory is 
a mixture, ruled by both political and international agents. As a re-
sult, security is perceived both as an inter-domestic affair and as a 
type of conflict that exceeds one state’s capacity; hence, security is-
sues require a reconfiguration of the local and the international order, 
39. Ibíd.,  p.  XXXV.
40. Ibíd., p.  XXXVI.
  41. Samuel Huntington, El choque de civiliza-
ciones y la reconfiguración del orden mundial, 
Paidos, Barcelona, 2005, p. 18. 
  42. Ibíd., p. 20.
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given that classic nation-states are considered bureaucratic entities, 
whose apparatus is too big for the resolution of security conflicts. 
Consequently, and given that the new world order is understood by 
tranformationalism as an integrated and interdependent system, 
global governance would be considered a need more than an option, 
mainly because, as it was mentioned previously, security issues ex-
ceed states’ scope, and require a wider framework that encompasses 
diverging and complex interests. 
3. Conclusion – The viability of global gover-
nance in the matter of security 
Conclusions regarding the actual existence of global governance, un-
surprisingly, vary and differ on their very essence. A cynical view un-
derstands that the incidence of war around the world over the past 
sixty years, and no international police force on the immediate hori-
zon, means that “there is little prospect for global governance mecha-
nisms that can prevent large-scale violence”.43 Furthermore, it has 
been said that collective security provisions set forth in Chapter VII 
have never been fully implemented, since efforts like Korea and Ku-
wait were not truly international operations with broad representative 
groups of contributing states.44 According to this approach, the United 
Nations and international organizations in general have proven to be 
ineffective in preventing war, since Cold War tensions and veto power 
in the Security Council often prevent the United Nations from launch-
ing concerted actions when faced with threats to international peace 
and security.45 Consensus in action is not reached because of super-
power rivalry and financial and human costs associated with security 
operations that are considered too high by many key states, which 
believe they have few direct national interests affected by conflicts far 
form they home base. 
Such a perspective understands that “the end of the Cold War and the 
establishment of what is called a new world order gave many idealists 
great hope for the role of international organizations in the realm of 
peace and security affairs”46, because consensus on taking strong 
action in conflicts such as the Gulf War and Haiti emerged, and there 
was increasing global attention to the concept of early warning, “the 
notion that the international community should be able to detect na-
scent conflict before it reaches the militarized stage and thereby take 
action that actually prevents violence rather than just dealing with its 
aftermath”. 47 However, it has been said that failures in Somalia, Bos-
nia and Rwanda revealed that international organizations could not 
 43. P.F. Diehl, “Peace and security affairs”, 
The politics of global governance: International 
Organization in an interdependt world, London, 
Lyne Rienner, 2005, p.193. 
44. Ibíd.
45. Ibíd.
46. Ibíd.
47. Ibíd.
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be expected to succeed in all ventures they undertake, and that the 
lack of political will and the presence of complex conflicts remained 
as obstacles to the establishment of a true new world order; specially 
since “currently, international organizations are still struggling with 
the new global environment and searching for the right mix of organi-
zational structures, procedures and strategies to deal with the variety 
of security challenges they now face”. 48
Similarly, Mearsheimer points that since the end of the Cold War, 
policy makers (western policy makers) have sought to create security 
arrangements in most regions of the globe that are based on inter-
national institutions, and that this approach to international politics 
rests on the belief that institutions are a key means of promoting 
world peace. He states that there has been a recent wave of aca-
demic interest in institutions, and quotes academic institutionalists 
who consider institutions to be a powerful force for stability, such as 
“avoiding military conflict in Europe after the Cold War depends greatly 
on whether the next decade is characterized by a continuous pattern 
of institutionalized cooperation”49, or, commenting about the end of 
cold war, “there seems little doubt that multilateral norms and institu-
tions have helped stabilize their international consequences. Indeed, 
such norms and institutions appear to be playing a significant role in 
the management of a broad array of regional and global changes in 
the world system today”50. The author considers such statements to 
be nothing but naive, since those assessments of institutions are not 
warranted, and they do not accurately describe the world, hence poli-
cies based on them are bound to fail.51
 
On the contrary, optimistic perspectives assess that, even tough effec-
tive global governance will not be achieved quickly, since it requires 
an enormously improved understanding of what it means to live in a 
more crowded, interdependent world with limited resources, the be-
ginnings of a new vision for humanity are given, and people and gov-
ernments are challenged to see that there is no alternative to working 
together and using collective power to create “a better world52”, but 
such a vision can only flourish if it is based on a strong commitment 
to principles of equity and democracy grounded in civil society. Ac-
cordingly, it is believed that the United Nations must continue to play 
a central role in global governance, since “with its universality, it is 
the only forum where the governments of the world come together 
on equal footing and on a regular basis to try and resolve the world’s 
most pressing problems”.53 Indeed, the United Nations is understood 
as the principal mechanism trough which governments could collab-
oratively engage in the multilateral management of global affairs. 
48. Ibíd., p. 194.
49. Robert Keohane, “The false promise of in-
ternational institutions”, in: John J. Mearsheimer 
ed. The politics of global governance; 3d ed., 
London, Lynne Reinner publishers, 2005, p. 61.
  50. John Ruggie, “The false promise of interna-
tional institutions” in: John J. Mearsheimer, The 
politics of global governance; 3d ed., London, 
Lynne Reinner publishers, 2005, p. 61.
  51. John J. Mearsheimer, “The false promise of 
international institutions”, in: John J. Mearsheim-
er ed. The politics of global governance; 3d ed., 
London, Lynne Reinner publishers, 2005, p. 91.
52. Ibíd.,
 53. Ibíd.
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Clearly enough, to understand the international system basically as 
a political conception –because the conflicts and contingencies that 
arise within its scope are not systematic or predictable in regard of 
their consequences- entails a necessary essential consequence: in 
terms of security, and the existence and convergence of the essential 
elements of governance –specially in a global level-,  states usually 
have to cope with the fact that conflicts surpass their control, either 
because they are too big and no longer capable of resolving problems 
that affect small communities, or because they are too feeble, hence 
situations like international crime or drug dealing are beyond their 
regulatory capacity, all of which could eventually become causes of 
external conflict between said states, because of eventually diverging 
interests and conflicting positions.  
As a result of the above, and although it is true that a given number 
of measures that aim for states’ compliance with general or shared 
security parameters has a long way to go before it is regarded as a 
system of rules, -mandatory and susceptible of being enforced, like 
domestic legal orders-, or even as elements of governance allowing 
for the encompassment of diverging conceptions –therefore provid-
ing an incipient notion of order-, the fact is that the aforementioned 
status quo, or the mere existence of diverging opinions regarding the 
role of the Security Council or conflicting conceptions about the ex-
istence of exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force –like re-
sponsibility to protect- are both evidence of a fact: that a collective 
conception of security as no longer a domestic issue actually exists, 
and such encompassment –or aim for encompassment- of diverg-
ing conceptions is clearly an essential and inexorable element of an 
eventual international normative system. 
In consequence, and even tough the United Nations Charter has been 
deemed both by scholars and some governments as an attempt to 
constitutionalize the international system, it is undeniable that out-
side each state’s own boarders, political reasons and statements or 
conceptions greatly influence the world order. Now, all of the above 
considered, it would be short-sighted to suggest that there not politi-
cal interaction between transnational actors, and that an important 
number of them does not aim for the resolution of problems that af-
fect one particular region or the whole international community –re-
gardless of what the existence of ulterior motives and what they could 
be-, therefore, there are responses to different sets of circumstances, 
which arise because of what security entails on international basis, 
and said response is indeed structured according to a process of in-
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teractive decision-making –as mentioned before-, in the search for 
the encompassment of the majority of subjects of international law, 
which means there is indeed global governance in terms of security, 
if the latter is understood as an aim for encompassment, but not as a 
legal regime or structure, meticulously and flawlessly functioning.  
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